Kadish Workshop in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory: David Enoch, Oxford University

Against Public Reason

I argue that public-reason (PR) political philosophy should be rejected. 

The reasons given in support of this conclusion address PR from a broader philosophical perspective than is common in this literature.

In particular, I use here a general discussion of idealization in meta-normative theory (put forward in my “Why Idealize?”) to shed light on the use that PR theorists make of idealization. Also, I rely on more general discussions of reasons for action and for belief to discuss the thought (or family of thoughts) that in order to be legitimate a political principle must be such that all have reason to endorse, as well as the thought that there is something objectionably “private” in the reasons for action of an agent who relies – in the political sphere – on the moral views that seem to her to be correct. 

Despite the negative general tone, I conclude with two more positive points: The first has to do with the right way for a political philosopher to think of her- or himself. PR accounts seem to think of the political philosopher as an arbiter who doesn’t (in her capacity as a political philosopher) enter the arena of “private” political disagreements, but takes that disagreement as a given and proceeds to ask how to respond to it. I suggest that political philosophers should acknowledge that all there is that arena, enter it, and join non-philosophers in thinking about and fighting for the good and the just. Second, suggest a way – more modest than a full PR account – to accommodate the intuition that PR theorists arguably get right.

Please note that David Enoch will be participating in the workshop over Zoom, but Room 141 will still be open to anyone who wishes to participate in person.

About David Enoch:

David Enoch does primarily moral, political, and legal philosophy. 

David studied law and philosophy at Tel Aviv University, then clerked for Justice Beinisch at the Israeli Supreme Court. He pursued a PhD in philosophy at NYU (2003), and has been a faculty member at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem ever since, on a joint appointment in philosophy and law. He started at Oxford as the Professor of the Philosophy of Law in 2023. 

David published work in metaethics (where he defends a robust, non-naturalistic kind of moral realism), in the philosophy of law (where he criticizes some versions of “general jurisprudence”, discusses moral and legal luck, and analyses the role of statistical evidence), in political philosophy (where he criticizes Rawlsian, public-reason liberalism, discusses false consciousness, and nudging), in ethics (where he discusses the status of hypothetical consent, and rejects the existence of moral luck), and more. 

About the Workshop:

A workshop for presenting and discussing work in progress in moral, political, and legal theory. The central aim is to provide an opportunity for students to engage with philosophers, political theorists, and legal scholars working on normative questions. Another aim is to bring together people from different disciplines who have strong normative interests or who speak to issues of potential interest to philosophers and political theorists.  

The theme for the Fall 2024 workshop is “Disagreement.”

This semester the workshop is co-taught by Josh Cohen and Véronique Munoz-Dardé.